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INTERLINKED CREDIT ARRANGEMENTS*
Robert R. Teh, ,If. * *
1, INTRODUCTION
Duringthe pastdecade,financialpolicyinthe Philippines hasbeen
pushedinthe generaldirectionof liberalization.The packageof reforms
includedliftingrestrictionsondepositandlendingrates,loweringreserve
requirements ondepositinstitutions, liberalizing branching regulations, and
removing the segmentation ofthefinancialmarketsbyblurring the speciali-
zationoffinancial institutions thathavearisen frombanking regulations. The
thrustoffinancialreformreflectedthe prevailing viewthatthe efficiencyof
financialmarketsinthe lessdevelopedcountries(LDCs)was hamperedby
regulationsof the type enumeratedaboveaswell asby the uncertainty
generated by a macroeconomicenvironmentconduciveto large public
deficitsandhighinflation(McKinnon1973). The macroeconomicregime
andthefinancialsectorregulations allcontributeto maketheacquisition of
financialinstrumentslessthanattractivefor economicagents.Thisargu-
ment that financialrepressionliesat the root of the inefficiencyof LDC
financialmarketsleadstotheconclusion thatareversalofthepolicyregime
willprovide incentives foracquiring financial instruments. Thisincreases the





production phases,covariateyieldsandspatialdispersion (Binswanger and
Rosenzweig1986), limiting theapplicability oftheneoclassical paradigm of
perfectandcompletemarkets.Insteadofanonymous agentstransactingin
frictionless markets, the identity and bargainingpower of each agent
becomecrucialindetermining gainsfrombilateral transactions. Information
asymmetriesputapremiumonclosemonitoring andpersonal tiestoavoid
adverse-selection effectsandminimize the problem Ofmoralhazard.Prices
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in such a world do not convey all the necessary information. Hence, even
in the absence of myopic and ill-designed regulations on LDC financial
markets as well as of a stable macroeconomic environment, the risk of
agricultural production and cost of information alone tend to hinder the
efficient functioning of capital markets. Unless these real factors are
appreciably changed, then financial markets in LDCs will continue to be
characterized by fragmentation and second-best efficiency,
In the Philippines, trade and exchange rate policies of the national
government have alsobeen biased against agricultural production and the
export of agricultural products (Bautista, Power and Associates 1979;
Bautista 1987). In responding to political pressure from urban consumers,
government hastraditionally optedto underprice agricultural commodities
and further distort incentives to farm production. These measures tax
agricultural production. But lessnoted isthe fact that these measures tend
to reduce the flow of savings and investment inthe rural sector and inhibit
the growth of the rural financial system. This isbecause the demand for
credit is a derived demand and rural saving is a function of agricultural
incomes. Hence, policiesthat limitthe growth ofagricultural production and
income also adversely affect the growth of the rural financial sector.
Table 1 shows the pattern of lending by the formal financial sector to
agriculture over the pastdecade. If financial liberalization were presumed to
be the panacea, then the potion certainly did not seem to have led tO a
rejuvenation. In fact, the ratio of formal sector lending to agricultural gross
value added (GVA) declined over time. 1
Factors hinderingthe development of anefficient ruralfinancial sector
may be grouped under four main categories-(i) regulations that serve as
barriers to competition among financial institutions, (ii) an unstable
macroeconomic environment characterized by high and variable inflation
rates, (iii) trade and exchange rate policies that bias incentives against
agriculture, and (iv)the high risk ofagricultural production and information
asymmetries that characterize agrarian economies. Policy should then be
pushed in a direction that alleviates the problems generated by these
factors. The thrust offinancial liberalization isto address factors (i)and (ii).
Tradeliberalization and the settingofa "realistic" exchange rate shouldhell:
1. This proposition is almost too dismissing of the potency ofpoliciesthat attempt to end
financial repression, In the first place, although financial liberalization has been a major thrust of
the public sector in the last decade, this was not accompanied by a stabilization of the
macroeconomic environment. Indeed, the 1980s were punctuated by severe international and
domestic shocks to the maoroeoonomy. It saw the worst balance of payments crisis and
recession in Philippine postwar history.
The downward trend intha ratio ofthe lending toagricultrual GVA may refleetthe winding
down of many subsidized lendingpolicies initiated by government and channeled through the
formal banking sector. Inthis case, although the magnitude offinancial riows hasdeclined one
can argue that the allocation of any given amount of lending will improve due to financial ,
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Table 1
RATIO OF LOANS GRANTED TO GROSS VALUE ADDED (GVA)
IN AGRICULTURE. 1980-89
(In percent}
Year Crops Livestock Fishery Forestry
1980 42.7 37.6 9.0 23,8
1981 44.1 38.5 11.9 34.3
1982 38.9 39.6 12.3 32.2
1983 39.7 34,3 14.2 25.6
1984 22.7 18.7 7.2 16.0
1985 18.3 9.7 4.7 16.9
1986 21.5 9.7 7.7 11.0
1987 22.3 8.6 7.4 12,8
1988 18.4 10.9 12.5 12.8
1989 16.0 11.6 9.5 12.2
Souroe:ACPCYearendCreditReport,/VEDAStadstical Yearbook.
correct factor (iii). Investmentin socialand physicalinfrastructureand
possiblylandreformwilllessenthe burdenposedby (iv).
Theforegoinganalysissuggeststhatfirst-bestpoliciesrequire(a) less
government intrusion infinancialmarkets,(b) getting pricesright,and(c)the
provision of publicgoods.To a large extent,thisreflectsthe viewthatthe
government,as an economicactor,shouldspecializein preciselythose
activities inwhichitenjoyscomparativeadvantage,i.e.,theproduction and
provision of publicgoods.Notethatthe provisionof publicgoodsmeans
much more than the buildingof roadsor bridges.To the extent that a
peaceful,orderlyand equitablesocietyis a publicgood,then the role of
governmentextendsbeyondsatisfying the needsof economicman.2
The decliningrole ofthe formalfinancialsystemin the provisionof
credittoPhilippine agriculture isofmajorconcerntopolicymakers, giventhe
strategicroleofagriculture. The agricultural sectoristheemployerofnearly
halfofthe laborforce_and the providerof incomefor nearlytwo-thirdsof
2. Theideathet amoreequitable distributionofincomerepresentsapublicgoodarises
ifitisassumedtheeconomicagentsarealt;ruistJc (seeHochmanandRogers1969), i.e., utility
isafuncl_on ofone'sownandothers'incomes.
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the population (Department of Agriculture 1990). In the past, the govern-
ment response tothis imbalance infinancing coming from theformal sector
was subsidized credit. The massive failure of rural banks and the high
default rates encountered in the supervised credit programs suggest the
inefficiency and unsustainability of these types of policy. Only a very small
proportion ofsmall farmers was reached bythese programs and they failed
to sustain credit support on a long-term basis (Technical Board for Agricul-
tural Credit 1985). At the same time, asignificant partof the subsidyimplicit
inthese programs was captured by big rather than small farmers (Esguerra
1981).
Onthe other hand, most small-scale farmers continued to obtain their
financing from informal credit sources. Inthe absence of detailed informa-
tion about the informal market, there isa wide range in the estimates of its
size varying from a low 37 percent to a high 90 percent (Agricultural
Credit Policy Council 1990) of total agricultural lending. Still these
estimates suggest that the informal sector has been a flexible and
significant source of funding for many agricultural enterprises, especially
small ones.
in light ofthese policy failures and the apparent unwillingness of the
formal financial system to increase the flow of credit to rural enterprises
despite the significant liberalization of the financial environment, there is
increasing interest inthe informal financial sector. The issues range from
assessing the efficiency of this sector to seeing how it interacts with the
formal financial system and other institutions of the agrarian economy (the
labor and land markets). How are problems of risk, moral hazard and
adverse selection handled by borrowers and lenders?What isthe structure
of interest rates charged in these informal arrangements? Do they vary
considerably and do they reflect the high cost of information and high risk
premiums, or are they monopoly rents?
One of the more fascinating aspects of_inancial relations in the rural
economy isthe prevalent interlinkedtransactions involvingcredit and either
labor arrangements, land use or marketing services. This practice of
interlinking isfound in largeareas ofSouth Asia. Its prevalence isobserved
inrural credit markets in the Philippines (Bautista and Magno 1990). There
are indicationsthat interlinkingispracticed widely inthe urban sector.Many
small enterprises in the urban areas have credit needs served not by large
banks but by agents who market their output or input suppliers.
Interlinking has been explained largely as a response to imperfections
inthe agrarian economy. These imperfections arecaused by the existence
ofrisk andinformation asymmetry, inthis context, these contracts produce
againineconomic efficiency. The question ofhow thisinstitutionwill survive
a majorland reform program that will cover a wide array of crops (sugar and
coconut beingthe more prominent ones) isimportant, given the promise (or
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empirical, ofthe evolution of these types of contracts incountries that have
undergone successful landreform programs. It issignificant to explore the
welfare implications of an institutional shock like land reform in a setting
where risk and information asymmetries are important and institutions
(interlinked contracts) exist that attempt to reduce these types of frictions.
The theoretical literature on interlinked credit contracts has been
focused ontenancy cure creditcontracts. Very few havedealt onother types
ofinterlinkedcontracts, for example, marketing cum credit orlandcumcredit
interlinking. 4 This gap in the literature may prove important, given the
historical experience of the rice sector which issubjected to land reform in
this country. Boththe green revolutionand landreform shiftedthe sourceof
informal credit from landowners to ricetraders. Credit continues as part of
an interlinked arrangement involving at the same time the conferment of
marketing rights to the trader-creditor.
This review attempts to provide the background for a more detailed
and rigorous examination, both theoretical and empirical, of the issue of
agrarian reform and interlinking. In a sense, this issue canbe interpreted as
part ofthe larger question ofinstitutional change inan agrarian setting. The
peculiar environment of the agrarian economy produces a set of relation-
ships and institutions. A subset of these institutions then will represent
means of copingwith certain forms ofmarket imperfections. The processof
economic development, whether engineered by the state or the private
sector, will entail a fundamental alteration of this environment and the
unraveling of some, if not most, of these institutions. The program of
agrarian reform represents an important innovation that will alter the
landscape of the ruralsector. An understanding ofthis process isnecessary
in orderto reducethe costs oftransition and adjustment. And itisinthis light
that the study on interlinked contracts should be seen.
This review contains six sections. After the introduction, section 2
provides a capsule summary of the share tenancy literature while section 3
describes leading explanations ofmarket interlinking. Section 4looks atthe
interlinking of marketing and credit services while section 5 deals with land
market and credit interlocking. The last section discusses some of the
welfare implications of various policy interventions, ranging from the ban-
ning of interlinked contracts to agrarian reform.
2. AN ANALYSIS OF SHARE TENANCY
Much Ofthe theoretical literature on interlinked credit arrangements
has been framed interms of the relationship between landlord and tenant.
This makes it difficult to provide a satisfactory survey of the field without
4. Themajor excep1_onsare Roro (1987),Geron(1989) and Roro andYotopoulos (1991).104 JOURNALOFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
delving into the literature on share tenancy. Hence, this chapter starts by
presenting some of the basic issues in this area. For a recent and
comprehensive survey of the field, the reader is referred to Otsuka and
Hayami (1988) and Hayami and Otsuka (1991 ).
The standard argument against share tenancy centers on the weak-
ening of work incentives that arises since the tenant receives only a share
of the marginal product of his effort. This analysis dates back to Alfred
Marshall (1890) and can beformally stated inthe following way. Let U (e,c)
bethe utility function of the tenant where e isthe level ofwork effort and c
isthe consumption of the tenant. Assume his consumption level isjust his
share of the output c --cxf(e), where f(e) isthe production function and cxthe
tenant's shareof the harvest. Maximizing U(e,c) with respect to effort leads
to the first-order condition:
(1.1) - Ue/U c = cxf'(e)
Here, Ue isthe marginal utility ofeffort, Uc the marginal utility ofconsump-
tion and f' (e) isthe marginalproduct ofthe tenant's effort. Hence, the tenant
setsthe marginal rateof substitution between effort and consumption equal
to a share of hismarginal product. Given that Uee < 0, this meansthe effort
exerted by the tenant islower than in a situation where c¢= 1.
Cheung (1969) considers the case where the optimal level of work
effort can be enforced by the landlord (see Figure 1). The level of effort is
measured along the horizontal axisand output and consumption along the
vertical axis. The curve f(e) is the production function while U* is the
indifference curve that assures the tenant his reservation utility level. The
curve (xf(e), onthe other hand, isthe shareof output that goes to the tenant.
The Pareto-efficient allocation ofeffort isgivenby e*. Thisoccurs at the level
of effort where the vertical distance between the productionfunction andthe
indifference curve U* ismaximum. An alternative characterization of the
first-best allocationisthat the tenant's marginalrateof substitution between
effort and consumption be equalto the marginal product of effort. In other
words, e* isthe solutiontoequation(1) when cc= 1.If thelevelof effort cannot
beenforced, then the tenant will shirkand supply only the level of effort e ".
This is where his indifference curve is tangent to his opportunity curve.
However, assuming that effort levele* can beenforced bythe landlord, then
the share contract will achieve the same level of resource efficiency. Note
that at e*, the tenant's indifference curve isnot tangent to hisopportunity
curve (c<f(e)). Hence he will want to shirk and offer lesseffort. However,
assumingperfect enforcement ofwork effort, this isnot possiblefor him. But
Cheung's assumption and analysisalso mean that afixed-wage and afixed-
rentcontract willyieldthe same first-best outcome, and otherconsiderations
will have to beprovided to explain why share tenancy is chosen relative to
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is given by the horizontal line WWwhich cuts U* at the same effort level e*.
The fixed-rent contract isgiven by the curve f(e)-_, where _ is the fixed
amount of rent turned over to the landlord. Again, if effort can be enforced,
then it achieves the same resource allocation as the share or fixed-wage
contracts.
Cheung suggests that inthe presence of uncertainty, share tenancy
allows a sharing of riskbetween landlord andtenant and provides anadded
dimension tothe choice between share, fixed-wage orfixed-rent contracts.
Heassumes a highertransaction cost for negotiating ashare contract than
for either a fixed-wage or fixed-rent arrangement. But a fixed-wage labor
contract requiresthe landlordto absorballthe riskof agricultural production.
A fixed-rent leasehold, on the other hand, forces the tenant to bear all the
risk of production. Hence, ifboth tenant and landlord are risk-averse, then
a share contract will allow anoptimal sharing of risk between them and will
be chosen if the benefits from the division of risk outweigh the higher
transaction cost of negotiating ashare contract.
However, this division of risk between landlord and tenant can be
attained bya mix of fixed-rent and fixed-wage contracts onthe assumption
that work effort isperfectly enforceable. This result isillustrated in Figure2
which isadopted from Hirshleifer and Riley (1979). Assume two possible
states of nature: a good state (g) and a bad state (b). The dimension of the
box in Figure 2 shows the corresponding harvest, ifeither state arises. O1
(Or) isthe originfor the landlord (tenant). U* isthe reservation utility levelfor
the tenant. The line 01A isthe certain income line for the landlord which
correspondsto the fixed rent contract. The lineOtBis the certain income line
for the tenant which corresponds in turn to the fixed-wage contract. The
diagonal line O101 corresponds to the pure share tenancy contract. To
determine the share parameter of the tenant ((x)of a contract like point E,
the ratio 01E/Ot01 istaken. Hence the midpoint Mcorresponds to (x = 0.5.
Any point within the area bounded by the linesOtBand 01A and not on the
main diagonalrepresents alinear contract of theform _ + (xf(e). _J ispositive
(negative) ifthe point lies below (above) the main diagonal. _ > 0 implies a
wage cum share tenancy contract while I] < 0 is a fixed rent cum share
tenancy contract. If the landlord isrisk-neutral and the tenant risk-averse,
the Pareto-optimal outcome requires the landlord to absorb all the risk. In
this case, onlythe wage contract willbechosen. If itisthe otherway around,
the fixed-rent contract will bechosen. Now, if both landlord and tenantare
risk-averse, then the optimal contract will be a (linear) share contract. This
optimum is found where the contract curve intersects the reservation
indifference curve U* (at point E'). Note that the pureshare contract will be
chosenonly under the most exceptional ofcoincidences, i.e., only under the
most exceptional of circumstances will the indifference curve U* cut the
contract curve along the diagonal.B Oi
-I
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However, this allocation of risk can be attained by a combined fixed-
rent and fixed-wage contracts. The proof outlined below isessentially due
to Newberry andStiglitz(1979) andrequiresonlythe assumptionof constant
returns to scale. An alternative proof due to Allen (1984) drops even this
assumption. The interested readerisreferred toit. Letthe landlorddivide his
fixed plotsothat the proportion(x'isrentedout at afixed rentalRto histenant
and the remainder (1-(z') iscultivated bythe same tenant at the wage rate
W. LetH be the size ofthe landlord's plotand assume that the total amount
of effort is contractually set at e = 1. Remember that the case being
considered assumes costless monitoring and enforcement of labor effort.
Assume the production function F(H, 1) exhibits constant returns to scale.
Now, consider a share tenancy contract of the form I]' + ¢'F (/4, 1). The
landlord receives -_' + (1-(x')F (H, 1). Now, set Rsuch that R = [(1 -_')
W-_'Ic('H]. Then thetenant's income is:
[F(oc'H,(x')-(x'RH] + (1-(z')W= F(c('H,(x') = oEF(H, 1) + 13'
The landlord's income isequal to:
(x'RH + IF((1-c(')H, (1-(x'))- (1-(z') W] -- F-((1-(z')H, (1-c('))-i_'
= (1-(z')F(H, 1)-13'
Hence, this alternative mixing of pure-rental and pure-wage contracts
replicates the outcome and the distribution of risk produced bythe share
contract. Ina world where labor effort isfully enforceable, the introduction
of uncertainty does not solve the puzzle as to why share tenancy contracts
are chosen over fixed-wage or fixed-rental contracts.
This hasled Newberry and Stiglitz (1979) to argue that share tenancy
contracts should be seenas an institution trying to carry out two functions
simultaneously: to allocate riskbetween tenant and landlordand to provide
work incentives for tenants in a situation where effort iscostly to monitor.
They argue that it is difficult to explain the existence of share tenancy
contracts unless risk-sharing and work incentive features arerecognized. If
the only problem is that effort is costly to monitor, then only fixed-rent
tenancy contracts will be observed. This is because under fixed-rent
tenancy, the tenant isrewarded the full marginal product of his effort. Also
ifthe only problem isrisk-sharing, then, assuming tenants are risk-averse
and landlordsrisk-neutral, onlyfixed wage laborcontracts will beobserved.
Furthermore, a mixture of pure rent and pure wage contracts can replicate
any risk-sharing property of a share tenancy contract. Adopting a share
tenancy contract should then beinterpreted as anattempt to balance these
two considerations. As _ goes to one, the tenant's work incentives are
increased but he bears a higher share of the risk of production. As (zgoes
to zero, the tenant's work incentives are dulled but he bears less of theTEH:INTERLINKED CREDITARRANGEMENTS 109
production risk. A share tenancy contract produces some sharing of the
production risk while simultaneously providing the tenant with enough
incentive to provide effort.
3. MODELLING INTERLOCKING CREDIT ARRANGEMENTS
Our discussion of interlinking starts with the surplus extraction argu-
ment which sees interlinking as another instrument by which the landlord
appropriates rent from his tenant. This is followed by an explanation of
interlinking as a deviceto avoidthe consequences of cropshare restrictions.
Third isthe credit market imperfection explanation which sees interlinking
as a spillover of credit-rationing in the formal financial sector. Next is an
explanation of the models of interlinkingcredit andtenancy contracts where
interlinking is seen as an attempt to deal with the dual problem of moral
hazard and risk diversification left unresolved by the tenancy contract.
Finally, the view of interlinking as a mechanism for screening is taken up.
A. Inter/inking as Surplus Extraction
The ideathat interlinkingprovides thelandlord with away ofextracting
a higherrate ofmonopoly rent from histenant was first broached by Bhaduri
(1973 and 1977). The presumptionofthe Bhadurimodelisthatthe landlord's
socialstanding arisesfrom hisproperty right to landand usury. Because he
usually owns no property, the tenant isrationed out of the modern capital
market. However, his tenancy contract can serve as a collateral to his
landlord who then becomes the main source of credit. The stationary
equilibrium in Bhaduri's model isthen characterized by perpetual indebted-
nessof the tenant. His share of the crop isjust enough for his consumption
requirement and for paying off the interest on his debt. It is, however,
insufficient to pay off the principal. He assumes that the landlord likes to
preserve these two modes of exploitation and will resist adopting new
technologiesthat increaseoutput to anextent that would allow thetenant to
avoid this cycle of indebtedness.
One of the problems with the model isthat it does not explicitly depict
the interaction between the sharing ratio and the provision of credit (size of
loan and the interest rate). Why is the landlord unable to maximize his
income just by altering the share ratio, givenhis presumed monopoly power
in the village? The issue can be framed more precisely in the following
fashion. Imagine a village where landlords require tenants to borrow from
them at a real interest rate higher than the alternative source (the village
moneylender). Let c¢ bethe current sharingratio. Now, suppose one landlord
decidesto untie his credit curetenancy contract. He cankeep histenantat
the same utility level asthe other tenants inthe village by requiring a higher
share ¢' (where (x' > _) for himself. The tenant willsurrender a highershare110 JOURNALOFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
of OUtput tOthe landlord but will in return be able to obtain credit at a lower
cost from the village moneylender. In equilibrium, the linked and unlinked
contracts should result in the same welfare levels for the tenants in the
village.
This analysis suggests the importance ofanalyzing the moneylending
activities of landlords inthe framework of the entire tenancy arrangement.
In this view, there is nothing which the provision of credit can add to the
appropriation ofsurplus from the tenant that cannot beachieved by simply
altering the share received by the landlord.
However, iflabor isheterogeneous, a monopolist-landlord will beable
to extract larger profits from tenants with an interlinked contract (see
Braverman and Guasch 1984). The intuition for this isthat the interlinked
contract functions as a screeningdevicethat allowsthe monopolist-landlord
to discriminate among high- and low-productivity tenants.
B. Interlinking and Legal Restrictions on Crop Shares
Braverman and Srinivasan (1981 ) emphasize the roleof legalrestric-
tions on crop shares inthe origin of interlinking. Two important arguments
in the Braverman-Srinivasan paper involve a refutation of the idea that
interlinkage represents anadditional instrument for surplusextraction and
an explanation of the existence of interlinkage as a response to the legal
floor on the tenant's crop share.
Credit intedinkage isconsidered as a redundant instrument for surplus
extraction because the landlord can achieve the same effect simply by
alteringthe sizeofthe tenant's land. Suppose agricultural workers have two
employment alternatives: work ascasual laborers and earn the utility level
U* or accept a share tenancy contract. Under profit maximization by
landlords, the equilibrium will becharacterized by eachtenant beingpushed
to the reservation utility level U*. This occurs simply with the landlord
reducing the size ofthe plotassigned to eachtenant. With areduction inplot
size the tenant must increase his work effort just to maintain his current
production (consumption) level. Hence, the same output level can be
generated from a smaller piece of land. There is, therefore, anincentive for
the landlord to decrease plot size since hisincome isa decreasing function
of plot size. So ifin the in!tial tenancy contract the tenant's utility isgreater
than U*, the landlord merely changes the terms of the contract so that a
smaller plot size isassigned to the tenant. He decreases the plot size until
the tenant's utility isequal to U* where a further alteration of plot size will
drive the tenant away to the casual labor market.
The formal argument can bepresented inthe following way. Consider
a tenant with a utility function (U(c,e)) that depends positively on current
consumption (c) and negatively on his effort (e). Assume U(c,e) isa strictly
quasiconcave function and that the following restrictions also apply:TEH: INTERLINKED CREDIT ARRANGEMENTS 11 1
(1.2) U_I_-U#J, > O, UJJ=--.UcU= < 0
Here Uc,Ue Ucc,U_, U_, and Uecare the par[ial first and second derivatives
of the arguments c and e, respectively. We assume naturally that Uccand
U_are both strictly negative. ByYoung's theorem, Uce= U=. The restric-
tions in (1.2) ensure that consumption and leisure (which isdefined as - e)
are normal goods. Note that this implies that Uc_ = Uec< 0.
Letthe tenant obtain the share c¢ of his total output with the landlord
getting the rest. Letthe production function F(e, H) belinearlyhomogeneous
in e and H where H is the size of the tenant's plot in hectares. Dividing
through byHand letting I = 1/H, we can write total output as f(el)/I. Assume
f' > 0 and f" < 0. Note that anincrease(decrease) inplot sizeisrepresented
by a decline (increase) in/.
Assume at the beginning of the period that the tenant borrows his
consumption for the duration and pays off the loanafter output isrealized
at the period's end. He can borrow from the village moneylender at the
interest rate raor from his landlord at the rate rt. Let v be the portion of his
total borrowing from hislandlord. Then, his consumption will be given by:
(1.3) c = _ f(e/)//[1 +vh+(1-v)r,] = _f(el)/I
where _ = [1 + vh + (1-v)ra] isthetenant's discounted share of output.
The tenant's problem isthus:
(1.4) Maxo U(_ f(e/)//, e)
subject to U = U*. The first-order condition isgiven by:
(I.5) ucr _ + Uo --0
The landlord's revenuespertenantisgivenby:
(1.6) R = (1-(x)f(e/)//+ v(rt-P)_f(el)/I
This can be rewritten as:
(1.6') R = {1-1311+vp +(1-v)rj]}f(e/)/I
Here 14isthe landlord's costof capital assumed different from r_. Inprinciple,
the landlord's problem isto maximize (1.6) by choosing ¢, v, rtand/subject
to keeping the tenant at the reservation utility level. But we only want to
examine the effect of a change in/on optimal e.112 JOURNALOFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
NOWz = el iseffort per hectare of land. Note that R isan increasing
function ofz. Hence so longas dzldl > O,the landlordwill have an incentive
to reduceplot size. Totally differentiate the first-order condition (1.5) to get:
dzld/ = [(6 flIUc)(U_U_-UoUcc) + (zllUc)(U_Uc-UeUco)] D > 0
where D = UccPIf"+ [(UZUccl2UcoUeUc+U_U2)/Uc 2] < O.
Hence, we conclude that in equilibrium, tenancy contracts will becharacter-
izedby utility equivalence, i.e., alltenants will be pushed to the reservation
utilitylevel U*.
The second important result of Braverman-Srinivasan is that the
landlordwillinterlinkthe tenancy and credit contracts ifthere isafloor onthe
cropshare ofthe tenant. Thiswill bethe landlord's attempt at recovering the
share of output that has been transferred to the tenant by law. The
interlinked contract willinvolve charging a veryhighrate of interest for rather
small loans. The formal argument goes something like this.
Letthere beaninitialequilibrium in which no linkingtakes place (v = 0).
The landlord's incomeisgivenby: Y* = (1-6* *)f(ex) = (1-o¢*)f(ex), since13"
= _*/(1 +ra)and 0 = 1 + ra.Here (x* isthe initialcrop shareand raisthe cost
of credit from the alternative source. Now suppose a legal floor on the
tenant's crop share (_f) is imposedwhere _* > (xf. The landlord can get
arbitrarilyclose to hisprevious income Y* byinterlocking credit and tenancy
contracts. This can be seen by considering the following sequence of
tenancy cum credit contracts: o_n o_f,rt -- n, vn= [(_t-(z*)( 1 + ra)]lno_*. This
impliesthesequences_]n= c_f/[ 1 + vnn+ (1-vn)ra]andn0 = 1 +v#'_+ (1-vn)ra.SO
as n-> =, C_n--> _t, rt*-> =, vn--> O.v,,n--> [(_c=*)(1 +r,)]/_*. Hence, Pn
--> ccr/{l+r,+[(=r- c_*)(l+G)]_*} = _*/(l+G) = p* and he--> l+G. Hence 1
-_nn-e 1-=*.
Note that the interest rate on the interlinked credit becomes arbitrarily
large while the size of interlinked credit goes to zero. If the legal restriction
does not exist, then there is no incentive for interlinking since the landlord
has essentially a redundancy of instruments for realizing his maximization
objective.
C. Interlinking and Credit Market Imperfections
Basu (1983) attributes the existence of credit interlinking to credit
market imperfections. Interlinking provides a device for lowering the risk of
strategic default. Basu assumes that the labor contract chosen is a pure
wage contract and that effort can be fully enforced by the landlord such that
the incentive problem would no longer exist. In his model, employers are the
main source of informal lending. Potential risk in the credit market exists
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borrowers are their own employees. This leads to what Basu terms
"isolation," a situation in which the credit market is fragmented, with
borrowing and lending taking place primarily between the employer and his
employees.
Although the employer is a sole supplier of credit in this isolated
market, hetakes as parametric his employee's reservation utility level U*.
The employee's indirectutilityfunction hasthe wage ratew andthe loanrate
i as arguments. His utility is increasing in w and decreasing in i. The
employer's incomecomes from hisfarm's output and interest revenues. His
costs are the cost of labor and the alternative cost of his funds.
Isolation can lead to interlinking of credit and wage contracts even
without any imperfection inthe labor market. To seethis, assume w* isthe
given market wage rate. Let L(_ be the demand for loans by the employee
andi* besuchthat L(I"*)= 0. SupposeU*, thereservationutilitylevel,satisfies
U(w*, i*) = U*. That is,the reservationutility levelisequal tothe utility of the
employee ifheaccepted awage offer w* without beingableto acquire credit.
Think ofthe pair (w*, i*) asan unlinked wage-credit contract. Now solong
asdU(w*, I")ldw* > 0 anddU(w _,i*)/di* < O,thenthere arelinkedcontracts
(w, _with w < w° andi < i* suchthattheemployeewillbeindifferentbetween
the linked and the unlinked contracts. The employer will bewilling to offer a
loan at a rate/below i° ifthe wage rate is sufficiently lowered below w ° .
Reducing/belowi* lowers the wage component of the employer's costper
worker bydwldi. However, hisinterest cost per employee goes up byL(I_ +
idL(l_ldi. Hence, solongasdwldi > L(I_+ idL D_/dithen theemployer willfind
itadvantageous tocontinue reducing the interest rate since wage costsfall
more than the rise in interest costs. Hence, it will be possible to observe
situations in which workers receive lessthan w* though no imperfections
exist in the labor market. The important point about Basu's explanation of
interlinking is that it suggests that linked markets are competitive, even
though taken individually they may not appear to beso.
D. Interlinking and Moral Hazard
Share tenancy isthought to balance the provision of work incentives
with risk-sharing. Although pushing (_to one will improve resource alloca-
tion, the resulting increase in riskborne by thetenant might be so high that
this would beuntenable. The imperfect work incentives provided byshare
tenancy contracts iscompensated for bythe welfare gainsarisingfrom risk-
sharing. This means that a mechanism which increases work incentives
while holding the allocation of risk constant will benefit the landlord.
Braverman and Stiglitz(1982) and Mitra (1983) arguethat interlinkingmight
be a way for the landlord to minimize shirking by his tenants.
The principal-agent problem arises ina situation where the principal
cannot completely specify the agent's actions but where at the same time114 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
the agent's actions have an important bearingon the principal's welfare. In
case of share tenancy, the tenant's incentive to exert effort isdiluted since
he obtains only a share of his marginal product. Furthermore, the tenant
usually has significant discretion in actions taken on the farm. Hence, to a
large extent, it will be costly for the landlord to completely monitor the
tenant's effort and enforce the pattern of behavior which the landlordfeels
is desirable. If the output of the tenant isalso affected by the vagaries of
weather and pests, the landlord cannot directly infer the amount of effort
based on realized output. This leads to a situation inwhich the landlord has
an incentive to induce more effort from the tenant. This inducement
mechanism may be provided by linking the provision of credit with the
tenancy arrangement. Note that the argument for interlinking provided by
Braverman-Stiglitz depends only on the existence of a moral hazard
problem and envisions no imperfection in the capital market as does
Braverman-Srinivasan. That is, so long as greater indebtedness by the
tenant inducesmoreeffort, the landlordwillfinditworthwhile totiecreditwith
thetenancy contract.
Braverman and Stiglitz's (1982) modelishelpful inillustrating some of
these ideas. Assume that the plot size isfixed at I = 1, Next, introduce
uncertainty bymaking output subjectto the vagaries of weather ortechnol-
ogy shocks. Hence, realized output canbe written as f(e)g, where g isthe
output shock with mean and variance normalized to unity. Finally, assume
that the tenant has borrowed an amount B at the start of the period and
needs to repay B(1 + r) at the period's end.
Thetenant's maximizationproblemisthen: MaxeE[U(ocf(e)g-B(1 +r),e)].
The first-order condition for effort is:
(1.7) o_'[Ucf'g] +E[Uo]= 0
Totally differentiate (1.7) with respect to e and Bto get:
de/dB = E(Ucc(xf'g)/E(U_ +EUc(xf" g + 2 EU_o_f'g + EUcc((Xf,g)2] > 0
An increment inthe indebtednessofthe tenant increaseshiseffort. Note that
this resultdepends onlyon the assumption that consumption and leisureare
normal goods (see equation (1.2)).
Now considerthe design ofan optimal tenancy contract between the
landlord and the tenant where the landlordoffers creditBin the initialperiod
and demands arepayment of B' at theend of the period. The implicit interest
rate charged by the landlord can be a function of the size of the tenant's
borrowing. Assume boththe landlordandtenant canborrow at thesame rate
p from the capital market. Braverman-Stiglitz shows that since de/dB > 0,
profit-maximizing behavior bythe landlordwill lead himto tie credit with the
tenancy contract so that he subsidizes the tenant. The proof isrelatively
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The landlord's problem isto maximize:
(1.8) Y = (1-_)f(e) + (r-p)B
subject to the reservation utility ofthe tenant.
(1.9) ELI[B, e, oJ_e)-(1 +r)B] = U*
The solution to this problem entails setting [(dY/dS)/dY/d8")] = [(dU/dS)/
(dU/dB")], i.e., settingthe marginal rateofsubstitution (MRS) of the landlord
equal to the MRS of the tenant. But the MRS of the tenant is equal to:
1/[(1 -(x)f' (e)de/dB" + 1]. Hence inequilibrium:
(1.10) U'(co)/EU'(cl,e) = (1 +lJ)/[(1-¢)f'(e)de/dS" + 1]
In a perfectly competitive capital market, the MRS between present and
future consumption should equal one plusthe real interest rate.
(1.11) b'(c_lU'(cl) = 1 + p
Comparing (1.10) with (1.11 ),this meansthat the landlordfinds itoptimal to
lower the real cost of borrowing for the tenant to induce him to sink deeper
intodebt.
E. Interlinking and Risk
While Braverman and Stiglitz (1982) and Mitra (1984) focus on the work-
incentive effects ofinterlinked credit arrangements, Kotwal (1985) empha-
sizes the risk-sharing effects. Given a particular share contract with its
associated set of work incentives and risk sharing features, is there a
mechanism for further attenuating the risk faced bythe tenant? In hisview,
the provision of credit by the landlord isa state-contingent side payment to
minimizefluctuations inthetenant's income. The landlord extends financing
during bad harvest ciwhile demanding repayment during unusually good
periods. This explanation isconsistent with the observed frequency of roll-
overs of loans and the accumulation of large debts by tenants with little
chance of being repaid.
The argument can be put in the following way. Let y = f(e) + bO
aggregate production with 0 representing the weather shock to output.
Assume 0 has mean zero and variance equal to var (). 6 Assume that we
havealineartenancycontractoftheform:_ = _ + coy= 13 + _f(e) + ¢¢,0where
¢ i$ the income of the tenant. The variance of the tenant's income is var
(_) = cr _vat(0). Now considerthe following alternative contract:¢' = _' + ¢¢'11 6 JOURNALOF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
[y-f(e*;e)^]. Here,f(e°;0)^ represents thelandlord's bestguessoftheoutput
level,ifeffortissetat the optimumlevele*,giventhestateof theweather.
Inotherwords,f(e*;e)^ = f(e°)+e8.Here,_ istheestimation errorwithmean
zeroandvarianceequalto var(*5).
• An interpretation of the contract-c'goes somethinglike this. The
landlord attemptstocompensate forfluctuations inthetenant'sincome from
the sharecontractby demandinga sidepaymentduringgoodyearsand
handingitoutduring badyears.Weather-caused fluctuations inthetenant's
incomearisefromthe behaviorof the terme. Duringgood(bad)years, e
ispositive(negative)andthusoutput ishigh(low).Hence,the alternative
contractintroduces thecompensating mechanism - oCf(e*;e )^= - _'[f(e*)+
+ e]thatreversesthe impactof0. Duringgoodyears(a positive valueofe),
theamount- _' isaddedtothetenant'sincome,whileduringbadyears(a
negative_/alue of e),the amount- o_' isaddedtothetenant'sincome.Note
the state-contingent sidepayment - _' e behavesmuchlikethe flow of
financingbetweentenantandlandlord. During hardtimes,whentenantsare
expectedtoasktheirlandlord for loans,thesidepayment- _' e ispositive.
Duringgoodtimes,whentenantsareanticipated to wantto paybacktheir
loans,the sidepayment- o_'e isnegative.
Now,writethe alternativecontractas:-_' = 13' + _'[f(e)-f(e*)]-c¢'*5. Set
c_' = _ and13' = 13 + c¢'f(e*) sothat-c'= 13 + _f(e) + _,5.Thevarianceof -_' isvar
(_')=c_ 2var(*5). Henceifthe errorof estimation (5hasasmallervariancethan
theshockvariablee, e.var(e)var(_),thenthealternative contract-c' Pareto-
dominates thefirstcontract.Thisisbecausebothcontractsgivethe same
expectedincometothe tenantbutcontract_'islessriskythan_. A share
contractwithstate-contingent sidepaymentsPareto-dominates a share-
tenancycontractwithoutsidepayments.Thisproof,however,requires that
f(e*) be known.Kotwarsexplanation suggeststhatoneneed notappealto
capital-market imperfectionsor any moral hazard problemto explain
interlinkedcreditarrangements.The fundamentalexplanationliesin the
inefficiency of sharetenancyas an instrument todissipaterisk.
F. Interlinking As a ScreeningDevice
Braverman andGuasch(1984)provide anotherrationale forcreditand
tenancyinterlinking. Supposethattheavailable pooloflabordiffersinability.
Aworkerof typei, assignedtoa fixedplotof land,isassumedto providea
particulargradeof labore(i).Eachworkermustalsoworkwithsomecapital
withthemoreableworkersgenerating a highermarginal productofcapital.
Nowlet usfurtherassumethatworkersare observationally indistinguish-
able. Then landlords willhavean incentive to developscreeningmecha-
nismstosortout thedifferentgradesofworkers.Theywanttoacquirethe
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generate a higher level of output. The interlinking of credit and tenancy
contract can be a screening device.
Landlords offer each prospective tenant i(1 ) ashare tenancy contract
with a fixed share (x(determined byconvention or by law), and (2) credit b(O
at the interest rate r(i). The idea isthat the interlinked contract forces self-
selection among the workers, with the more able ones choosing contracts
that offer a higher level of credit (and hence capital). This isbecause they
have the higher marginal product of capital. Now, the workers maximize a
utility function U_bO),t(t)] subjectto areservationutility level ofat least U* as
the level of welfare from unattached labor.
Let 7t[b(/1,r(z_]be the landlord's income from the interlinked contract.
The landlords behave as monopolistic competitors. In equilibrium eachone
will beattached to a particular grade of labor but the profit of the landlords
from any given contract will be the same. In particular, let the workers
indexed n be the lowest grade of labor that ends up as share tenants. Their
utility must equal the reservation level U* and let_* bethe level of profits of
the landlords who employ them. Then, in equilibrium, all landlordsearn the
amount_*.
The equilibrium in this model turns out to bea sorting equilibrium, sIn
this sorting equilibrium, the more able tenants choose to borrow a greater
amount of capital. With a higher marginal product of capital, they should
produce more output than less able tenants. Since the equilibrium is
characterized byequality of profits among landlords, the employers of the
more able tenants must offer a lower interest rate totheir tenants. Hence in
equilibrium, the loan-interest rate schedule isdownward sloping.
Itis notclearwhether thesorEing equilibriumproducedbytheinterlinking
isPareto-efficient sincethe capitalchosen by each gradeof labor cannot be
lessthan in the first-best world (where each grade of labor isdistinguish-
able). Hence, the screening might induce a substantial overinvestment in
capital by each grade of labor to distinguish it from lower grades. 6 The
departure from Pareto-efficiency obviously depends on how close the
different labor types are.
5. Asorting equilibrium canbedefined asasetofcontracts S(i)= (bO_,rO)) such that:
(i) for/> n,U1 [b(/),tO)] > U1 [_*),/_/')] forallj;
(i) fori =n,Ul[bO),rO) =U*;
(ii) for/>n,td, b0),r0)] =tr*.
This means thateach cetegow oflabor, i,strictlyprefers thecontract LLabor typen(the lowest
grade oflabor togetatanancy contract) gets thereservation utilitylevel and landlords getthegoing
rentalrateonland.
6. This result isfamiliar frommodals ofsignalling (Spenca 1974).118 JOURNALOFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
4. PRODUCT AND CREDIT MARKET INTERLINKING
The linking ofcredit and product marketing contracts hasreceived far
lessattention than the linkingof sharetenancy and credit. At the same time,
more consideration has been given to the latter case of interlinking in the
Philippines where interestcenters on rice and the peculiar mix of historical i
circumstances involving the" greenrevolution" and land reform.
Starting in the mid- 1960s, a drive bythe public sector in this country
was initiatedto encouragethe widespread adoptionof modern rice varieties.
The advent of the Green Revolution yielded significant increases in rice
production especially in Central Luzon. The result was that a large amount
of rice surplus moved from farms to markets in urban areas. The demise of
the traditional landlord-tenant relationship ruptured ties involving credit. A
new set ofties hasevolved inthe meantime involvinglargetraders requiring
reliable and low-cost sources of rice as well as farmers with continuing
needs for both financing and transporting output from farm to market.
Inthe extensive literature on tenancy and credit interlinking, the idea
that the institution of share tenancy attempts to balance the problems of
moral hazard and allocation of the risk of production provides a natural
handle for explaining interlinking. Interlinkingprovides anadded instrument
for reducing moral hazard (Braverman and Stiglitz 1982; Mitra 1984) or
achieving a better distribution of risk between landlord and tenant (Kotwal
1985). That natural handle is missing in the issue of why marketing and
credit contracts are interlinked.
One of the first questions to ask is: do trader-lendersprimarily employ
credit interlinkages to facilitate trading activities (Geron 1989; Floro and
Yotopoulos 1991 ) ordothey basicallyavailthemselves ofoutput interlinking
tolower the riskofstrategic defaultof borrowers (Bell1990; Hoff and Stiglitz
1990; Siamwalla and associates 1990; and Udry 1990)? This question is
central because itfocuses onthe exact information and incentive problems
being addressed by interlinking. Ifthe latter isthe case, then¢he entire issue
of output-credit interlinking isbestframed asa contractualmechanism that
(a) allows creditors to better screen borrowers, (b) provides greater incen-
tives for repayment, and (c) strengthens the enforcement of repayment
(Hoff and Stiglitz 1990). If the former isthe case, though, then interlinking
canbeexplained as a mechanism whereby thetrader gainsaccess to supply
ora mechanism for smoothing fluctuations inthefarmer-lender's delivery of
marketable surplus.
Udw's paper (1990) isintriguing becauseof the absence of interlinked
contracts inhisstudy areain Nigeria. Given the seemingly ubiquitous nature
ofinterlinking in less developed agrarian economies, it is a valuable piece
of empirical work in that it leads us to consider under what conditions
interlinkingisunnecessary. He conjectures that its absence inthis particular
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selection problem inthe small, closely-knit community heobserved, About
half ofthe variability in income isidiosyncratic, with slightly more than half
being accounted for by village-level shocks. Hence, borrowing and lending
among members of the village, deemed as insurance against idiosyncratic
risk, create substantial benefits.
Diversification of risk across communities is served by a class of
merchants with long-term relations with other merchants across Nigeria.
These traders may lend to local villagers but do not require interlinking
because of familiarity with borrowers and local events. They may in turn
obtain some oftheir credit from merchants outside the village with perhaps
the long-term and historic nature ofthese trading tiesserving to discourage
a likely strategic default.
On the other hand, FiorDand Yotopoulos (1991 ) explain credit and
output interlinking as profit-maximizing behavior by the trader-lender,
without any explicit assumption about imperfections in credit or output
markets. Their explanation for interlinkingisthat the lender' sprofit risesby
increasing his share of the trade in marketable surplus. The drawback of
their model is that it solves the simple profit-maximization problem of the
trader, in which case the Kuhn-Tucker conditions only generate an offer
curve for a bundled (interlinked)contract. Itdoes not havea reciprocal offer
curve from the borrower; hence, the borrower's incentives for accepting a
bundledcontractareunclear.Consideringthe way that theprofitmaximization
problem isset up, there are market prices for unlinked credit and marketing
services. The existence of these prices deepens the puzzle as to why
interlinking can achieve a Pareto-superior allocation over and above com-
petitive equilibrium (when contracts areunbundled).
There at leasttwo important incentivesthat would motivate the lender
to accept a bundling of the contract-if it manages to reduce his cost of
marketing his own output and if he iscredit-rationed. Hence we have to
assume that the borrower iscredit-rationed and that the observed priceof
unlinkedcredit isreallythe prevalingpriceinthe formalsector of a"dualistic"
financial system.
Geron (1989) suggests that interlinking isdesirable not only for the
trader because it increases his command over marketable surplus but also
for the farmer since it lowers marketing costs. This point isnot developed
any further though since her concern is more with characterizing the
relationshipbetween the priceat which the trader willpurchase the farmer's
product and the interest rate on the loan. Given that interlinked contracts
exist, what istheexpected relationship between priceand interest rate, and
doesthis relationship vary with the nature of the borrower? Geron assumes
two distinct motivations ofborrowers: consumption (Type 1) andpurchases
of inputs (Type 2). With Type 1 borrowers, the lender encounters some
moral hazard problem because the loan size (and hence, the level of
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effort is important to the lender because it will determine the output size
which theborrower can make available to the lender for marketing. Geron
assumesthat lenderscandistinguish between two types of borrowers. This
distinction of borrower types seems a trifle arbitrary since itisunlikely that
lenders can adequately monitor the useoffunds unlessthe lender provides
credit in kind (fertilizer, pesticide, etc.). With significant monitoring costs,
lenders will always face significant moral hazard problems in their lending
decision.
Itturns out that the resulting iso-profit or indifference curves of either
type of borrower are positively-sloped inthe price(P) and interest (i) space.
Profit-maximization bythe trader-lender then requires him to choose that
combination of i and P such that the marginal cost from decreasing i or
increasing P just equals the marginal gain from increased effort induced
from the farmer-borrower.
There isgood reason to believethat more researchin credit and output
interlinking will lead to more insights into motivations underlying these
bundled contracts. It islikely that at the root ofthese bundled contracts lie
the problems of asymmetric information successfully utilized to explain
various aspects ofagrarian economies. At the same time, current explana-
tions ofoutput-credit interlinkinghave not satisfactorily addressedthe other
roleofthe lender astrader or provider of marketing services. To what extent
do production risk, the trader's desire to gain access to a stable and
adequate supply of marketable output, the cost of storage, and output price
variability influence the desirability and terms ofinterlinked contracts, if at
all? Framing some of the issues this way will yield a richer and more
substantial data base on interlinked output and credit contracts.
5. LAND AND CREDIT INTERLOCKING
According to Floroand Yotopoulos (1991 ), the observed provision of
credit by farmer-lenders involving the tying of usufruct rights on the land
owned by borrowers constitutes interlinking.The bundlingofthese transac-
tions isdesirable to borrowers because they are credit-rationed by formal
creditors or the village moneylender. On the other hand, the lender can, by
appropriately choosing the borrower and the terms of the credit contract,
influence the incidenceof default. Forthe individualinterested in increasing
ownership of land, this provides a cheaper way of acquiring more land.
If there are legalimpediments restricting the current owners' property
rights to hisland, then interlinkingreflects the spilloverof these obstaclesto
the credit market. More importantly, the existence of interlinkingnow need
not require that the lender be able to induce agreater probability of default
bythe borrower. The dilutionof property rightstolandacquired through land
reform inthe Philippinesarisesfrom the restriction on landtransfers onlyto
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these restrictions isfar from perfect, the transfer ofland rightsto individuals
other than heirs can still take place, although on a temporary rather than
permanent basis. The partial effectiveness of the prohibition makes the
appropriability of the stream of rentals on land far into the future more
uncertain than inthe current period. For the farmer interested in acquiring
more land to cultivate, a rental market might bebetter for him because he
canhedge against the possibilityof being caught in violation of the law. The
owner of the land may inturn be credit-constrained inthe formal financial
sector because hislandisinsufficient collateral, given that rightsto itcannot
betransferred. The provision of credit rather than a pure rental agreement
will be desirable to hedge against a future default.
Such an explanation is deemed more consistent with the evidence
provided by Otsuka (1991 ) and Nagarajan and David (1990) regarding the
increasingly prevalent practice of land pawning fn Central Luzon. In these
pawning arrangements, credit is provided to a borrower in exchange for
temporarycultivationrightstotheborrower's pmperW. AccordingtoNagarajan
and David, 42 percent of suchcontracts fali below two years induration and
about 70 percent .of such contracts are made with relatives, business
associates or friends. Cases of a permanent transfer of land rights appar-
ently occurred infrequently.
Otsuka (1991 ) arguesthat compared to other South Asian countries,
land reform under the Marcos government was relatively successful,
especially in Central Luzon. For farmlands below seven hectares, share
tenants were converted to leaseholdtenants, with the amount ofleasefixed
under law. For farmlands exceeding seven hectares, excess land was
transferred to current share tenants provided landtitles acquired this way
could only betransferred to legitimate heirs. This periodalso coincided with
the spread of modern ricevarieties (the" greenrevolution") with returns to
land planted to the modern varieties increasing substantially over time. We
then find asecular shift rightward ofthe market demand curve for rice lands
while the prohibition against resale of lands acquired under land reform
limited the amount of land that could betransferred. Pawning emerged as
a surrogate for a land market. Buyers (sellers) interested in acquiring
(disposingof) temporary or even permanent landrightscould transact in the
surrogate market since the land market could not develop under thee
prohibition.
Land is a durable asset whose returns R(t) are spread out over time.
Assume R(t) as output lesspayments tothe variable factors of production,
i.e., rent. Ownership of landthen confers aright to appropriate those rents
R(t). Let 6 be the instantaneous discount rate and V(t) be the value (price)
of land. If the function R(t) isknown, then:
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That is, the market price of land issimply equal to the present value of the
rental stream. Prohibitionson outright transfers of land heldby land reform
beneficiaries can bethought of aslying on a continuum of effectiveness. At
one extreme, the enforcement can be so lax that the land market is
completely unaffected bythe introduction ofthe legislation. Inthis case, the
acquisition price of land continues to be given by (4.1) and the purchaser
appropriates the discounted value of the entire stream R(t). At the other
extreme, itispossiblefor such restrictionsto be absolute such that the price
of landisundefined since no market transaction takes place. The stream of
rents isinappropriable by anyone other than the current beneficiary and his
heirs. In between liesa regionof varying degreesof success inenforcing the
regulation. A natural way of thinking about what itmeans for the prohibition
to become more effective isto imaginethat the appropriability offuture rents
to anyone else becomes increasingly uncertain.
Let F(t) be the cumulative probability that the prohibition becomes
bindingat time t where P (t)isthe corresponding probabilitydensityfunction.
Assume this means that the individual gets caught violating the regulation,
thus losingthe rental stream beyond period t. Assume further there exists
a Tsuch that F(T) = 1. An increase inthe effectiveness of the prohibition is
seen as a decrease in the value of 7-.This reduces the duration that the
purchases are able to appropriate the rents from the land. The expected
purchase price isnow:
(4.2) E--IV(t)]= It [I t exp(-Ss)R(s)d$]F' (_)d_
Noting that F'(t) = 0 for t > Tand integrating by parts lead to:
(4.3) E[V(t)] = fTexp (-as)R(s)[1-F' (s)]ds
The prohibition has two effects. 7 First, the effect of the uncertainty isto
effectively truncate the horizon inwhich the purchaser expects to enjoy the
benefitsofownershipfrom land. The resultisthe development of asurrogate
land market where land isleased for a duration of 7".A rental market arises
as a way for agents to hedge the risk from being caught violating the
prohibition. Short-term leasesof land will be lessrisky than outright sales.
Second, the prohibition results in a sharper discounting of the expected
stream of earningsover that truncated horizon, with the additionaldiscount
factor being 1-F'(t). The uncertainty associated with the legal prohibition
results in undervaluation of the rental stream relative to what would have
occurred in a situation where property rights are fully conferred upon land
reform beneficiaries. This indicates that undervaluation of rental values
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need not be attributed solely to monopoly power exercised by lesseesover
lessors.
Credit rather than direct rental payments isviewed as away of getting
around the legal restriction on the transfer of usufruct rights to land. The
empirical evidence on land pawning is consistent with this view that cash
advances provided by"lenders" have the same character as payment for
landleases. The observed intedinking isnot a response to sometechnologi-
cal feature of the rural landscape as istrue inthe share-tenancy with credit
contract. In the latter, interlinking arises as a response to the problem of
moral hazard. In the case we are concerned with, legal restrictions on
property rights provide the rationale for the development of a land lease
market in which rentalpayments arethen hidden inthe guiseof credit. This
analysis suggests that although these restrictions on property rights to land
may have a benevolent motivation (to prevent a resale to previousowners),
they have the undesirable effect of devaluing the collateral value of land
owned by the landreform beneficiaries. Ultimately, these restrictions make
land reform beneficiaries poor credit risks from the point of view of formal
financial institutions and undermine their access to these institutions.
6. WELFARE AND POLICY ANALYSIS
Given the various explanations advanced for credit interlinking, an
assessment of the welfare impact ofdifferent types of policy interventions
may now proceed. The policy prescriptions for evaluation are the banning
ofinterlinking and land reform.
A. Banning Inter/inking
Much ofthe interlinkingliterature views the bundling of contracts as a
welfare-increasing institution. Certain quarters continueto have misgivings
about the welfare effects of these bundled contracts (Floroand Yotopoulos
1991 ), but for the most part, they areviewed as increasingefficiency. Inthe
moral hazard literature, the bundling minimizes shirking and shifts the
allocation of effort closer to the Pareto-efficient level. In the risk-reduction
literature, the bundlingofcontracts lowers the riskof agriculturalproduction
for the risk-averse peasant and shifts the allocation of risk closer to the
Pareto-optimum (with all the risks borne by the risk-neutral landlord and
none bythe tenant). Inthe credit market imperfection literature, the bundling
allows Pareto-improving trades in which a reduction in wage rates is
compensated for bythe availability offinance. Given this presumption, any
restriction on interlinkedcontractswill haveanadverse effect on welfare and
efficiency.
However, itmight beinstructive to clarify how the presumed gainsare
distributed between the landlordand tenant. Interlinking can bethought of124 JOURNALOFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
as shifting the utility possibilityfrontier ofboth tenant and landlord. Figure 3
shows the utility possibility frontier for the landlord and tenant before and
after interlinking. The vertical axis measures the landlord's income (which,
given risk neutrality, islinearly related to hisutility) and the horizontal axis
measures the tenant's welfare. The curve UUis the utility possibility frontier
without interlinkingand U' U' isthe utilitypossibilityfrontier with interlinking,
It liesfarther out than UU because ofthe efficiency gains arising from less
shirking, or a better allocation of risk, etc. Assume the initial allocation of
welfare isgiven bypointA. The question is, where willthe new equilibrium
allocation bewith interlinking?A pointlikepoint B, which isanallocation that
improves thewelfare of both parties inthe transaction, ispossible. But points
like C (inwhich the tenant loses from interlinking) or point D (in which the
landlord losesfrom interlinking) are alsopossible. The idea that interlinking
iswelfare-improving means that the utility possibility frontier isshifted out.
Butitdoes not meanthat the divisionof thebenefits from interlinkingaccrues
equitably to both parties or guarantees that no party loses from it.
Interlinking asa voluntary transaction inno way invalidatesa point like
C or D being achieved. The phenomenon we are describing here is
analogous to the effects oftechnological change inagriculture which faces
aninelastic demand for its product. It isrational for the individual farmer to
want to increase income byinnovating. Butwhen allfarmers adopt modern
agricultural practices and become more productive, the resulting shift inthe
supply curve depresses food prices and lowers total farm income. Of
course, ifthe individual farmer does not undertake to increase his produc-
tivity, thereduction inhis income will begreater since the reduction inprice
is not offset by an increase intotal output.
Banning interlinking istantamount to shrinking the utility possibility
frontier and will always involve a welfare loss for at least one party.
Policymakers who are concerned with the monopoly power of landlords in
these bilateral trades should be directed to find ways of redistributing the
gainsfrom interlinkinginstead oftrying to outlaw the institution itself. Since
interlinking involves a shift outward of the utility possibility frontier, it will
always bepossible, inprinciple, to redistribute the gains insuch a way that
no one ends up worse off. Such policies might involve the rehabilitation of
rural banks, encouraging NGOs to compete aslenders or developing credit
cooperatives inthe rural areas. The ability ofthese institutions to generate
Ioanable funds efficiently and to respond to the requirements of small
farmers on a sustained basis remains an open question.
B, Land Reform
The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) envisions a much
wider application of landreform to includeimportant crops like coconut and
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traditional credit relationship between landlord and tenant. However, there
isageneral presumption inthe tenancy-credit interlinkingliteraturethat land
reform will resultin anunambiguous increasein the share tenant's welfare.
This will occur even though the tenant might be forced to seek credit at a
price much higher than his landlord iswilling to provide.
The Braverman-Srinivasan model is useful to work out the welfare
analysis. 8Prior to land reform, assume the landlord isthe cheaper source
ofcredit (rl < r=)sothatthetenant's consumption andthe landlord's income
are:
(5.1) C = _Jf(ex)
(5.2) Y = (1-_O)f(ex)
where,] = c¢/(l+rt) ande = 1 + ri. The move to land reform can be
decomposed into two steps-the tenant must acquire his finance at the
higher cost ra, and his share of the harvest (co)goes to one.
But with no restriction on the crop share, the landlord can always
choose (zsuch that heattains his previous _. That is, set itto (z' = c_(1+ ra)/
(1 +rt). The tenant's consumption isgiven by:
(5.3) C' = (x'/(1 +rs)f(ex) = C
Now, however, the second step implies that _' is adjusted towards unity,
resulting in an unambiguous increase in consumption and hence welfare for
the tenant.
This still leaves unresolved the central issue of where the credit needs
of the new landowners are going to be met. A comparison with the land
reform experience in rice might be misleading because land reform was
accompanied by technological change. The increase in rice productivity
allowed a natural linking of interest between rice farmers and traders. This
isunlikely to be replicated insugar and coconut, where productivity has been
lagging for decades and no signs of significant progress are seen.
In principle, the new landowning class can become attractive to the
formal financial sector since the newly-acquired lands can serve as collat-
eral. This interest might be accentuated if the land reform program is
accompanied by asupport package including infrastructure and extension.
This public investment might increase farmers' expected incomes and
reduce the risks of peasant agriculture, and both factors should work to
increase the market value of land.
8. It is important to nots, though, that the model proceeds from the absence of any
uncertainly; hence, the unbundlingofthe linkedcontraot asaresult of land reform isgoingtoentail
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In this regard, it is important to emphasize that the design of land
reform laws must be subjected to intense economic scrutiny because no
matter how well-meaning these might be, they may tend to produce quite
unwelcome orunexpected consequences. This resultemerges quite clearly
insectior_5 ini a discussion of how restrictionson propertydghtsto newly-
acquired landhavethe effect of devaluing themarket priceof thetransferred
property.
The rationale for imposing these restrictions on resale hasto do with
preventing a return of landto previous owners. It might be argued that the
reversion of landto the original owners and the resulting concentration of
landownership is socially undesirable. It isdifficult togauge how real these
fears are. First of all, the original owners have undergone a capital loss in
the forced saleof their property to the state. Second, a landreform program
accompanied by a package of support services provided by the state ought
to increase the productivity of land and make it more attractive to keep. I
Finally, proponents of land reform have always argued that the equity
consideration isthe most important objective. Whether the beneficiary then
decides to keep the increase in wealth in the form of land, more human
capital orfinancial assets should beirrelevanttothe goalof moving towards
a much fairer distribution of assets. Rates of return on other assets are
possibly higher than in land; thus, forcing these new owners to hold their
windfall gaininthe form of landisnot goingtobe Pareto-efficient. Evenifthe
beneficiaries decide to resell to the original owners, this will not involve a
return to the status quoante since theformer will be benefited tothe extent
of the repurchase price of the land. If the new owners are to draw full
advantage from the resultsofthe redistribution effort, property right restric-
tions ought to bedone away with altogether.128 JOURNALOFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
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